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NOTES
thereby facilitating comparison of the tax bases applied to interstate and
local truckers. Assuming an agency function of guarding against this
overt discrimination, the difficulty of comparing the relative burdens of
local and interstate trucking calls for agency prescription of an interstate
"benefits" apportionment factor.
This plan, while not infringing on existing freedom to select the tax
base favored for allocation of burden, also makes state attempts at dis-
crimination more easily detectable. Of course, the agency should be given
broad powers to investigate state practices in order to discover delicate
shades of discrimination. At the same time, adoption of such a system
simplifies its task of divining the most accurate apportionment measure.
The agency, then, could inaugurate studies which ultimately might also
unearth precise yet administrable methods of allocating the highway
burden between classes of users.
COERCION: A DEFENSE TO MISCONDUCT WHILE A
PRISONER OF WAR
Recent innovations in psychological coercion and use of false con-
fessions in the current war of propaganda have emphasized the latent
exiguity of traditional military law regarding coerced prisoners of war.'
The charge has been voiced that both military and international laws con-
cerning coercive defection of such prisoners are obsolete because of these
developments.' This contention is too superficial. The problem of how
the Armed Forces should handle these prisoners upon their return from
captivity is complex and requires a complete reappraisal of the juris-
prudence on the subject.
In the past, military authorities have given too little consideration to
the problems of the relative degrees of harm to the national security
caused by various disloyal acts, the different kinds and severity of coer-
cion applied, and the over-all effect of the acts on military morale.' Thus,
much more is called for than an attempt to reconcile or modernize the
traditional approach.
1. The term coercion, throughout this paper, is used in the sense of pressure of any
type applied by one person upon another to force a desired action. This includes a gamut
of acts from bad treatment such as meager amounts of food to brutal physical and mental
torture.
2. Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 21, 1954, p. 2, col. 1.
3. See the discussion at p. 611 infra.
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The cases of Marine Colonel Frank H. Schwable4 and Army Cor-
poral Edward S. Dickenson5 have brought the entire problem into precise
focus. A Marine Corps Board of Inquiry was appointed to investigate
Schwable's false confession of waging bacteriological warfare made
while a prisoner of the Chinese communists and to determine what action,'
if any, should be taken against him, considering the degree of physical
and mental coercion involved.7 Corporal Dickenson has been tried by an
Army court-martial on charges of giving information to his captors con-
cerning fellow prisoners in order to secure favorable treatment for him-
self and unlawfully collaborating with the enemy.' Dickenson has main-
tained in defense that all wrongful acts he may have committed while
4. For a comprehensive coverage of Colonel Schwable's background and his ex-
periences as a captive, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1954, §4, p. 2, cols. 1-4.
5. For a discussion of the background of the Dickenson case, see Louisville Courier-
Journal. Feb. 18, 1954, p. 2, cols. 1-2; Indianapolis Star, April 20, 1954, p. 3, cols. 1-3.
6. In appointing the Board of Inquiry to investigate the case, Gen. Lemuel C. Shep-
herd, Jr., the Marine Corps Commandant, said on Jan. 23, 1954: "I expect the court to
advise me as to whether the degree of physical, mental and psychological suffering ex-
perienced by Colonel Schwable was such as would reasonably constitute an excuse for
acts of the type he is alleged to have committed." N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1954, §4, p. 6, col. 1.
7. The crucial question before the Board of Inquiry seemed to be, ". . . should
the Marine Corps excuse an officer for breaking under the kind of mental and physical
torture techniques perfected by the Communists? Can it overlook the medical opinion
that every man has his eventual breaking point? Does it have the right to expect that
Marines will stand firm where other men have failed?" Id. at col. 2.
It is possible that on the basis of the "brainwashing" which Schwable underwent that
a defense similar to that of temporary insanity might be raised. It is important to note
that the case is similar to the situation of insanity; however it is suggested that the many
problems involved in such a defense, coupled with its infrequent acceptance in judicial
proceedings, makes coercion a much more plausible and acceptable defense. On Apr. 27,
1954, the Department of Defense announced that Schwable had been cleared from any
disciplinary action. The Board of Inquiry said he had resisted torture to the limit of his
ability and was reasonably justified in making the false confession, Louisville Courier-
Journal, April 28, 1954, p. 3, col. 1.
8. The three specific charges lodged against Dickerison at the opening of the court-
martial were: (1) Corresponding and holding intercourse with the enemy in violation
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. (2) Informing on Pfc. Edward M. Gaither of
Philadelphia, a fellow prisoner, by telling the enemy Gaither intended to escape. As a
result of this he suffered beatings and other torture. (3) Informing on Cpl. Martin Chris-
tensen of Libertyville, Ill., another prisoner, and telling the Communists he had a gun in
his possession. Because of this Christensen was jailed and repeatedly beaten. Indian-
apolis Star, April 20, 1954, p. 3, col. 3. These are based on Articles 104 and 105 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. c. 22 (1951). Article
104 reads: "Any person who-(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, am-
munition, supplies, money or other things; or (2) without proper authority, knowingly
harbors or protects or gives intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or
holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or
such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct." Article
105 provides: "Any person subject to this chapter who, while in the hands of the enemy
in time of war-(l) for the purpose of securing favorable treatment by his captor's acts
without proper authority in a manner contrary to law, custom, or regulation, to the detri-
ment of others of whatever nationality held by the enemy as civilian or military prisoners;
or (2) while in a position of authority over such persons maltreats them without justifi-
able cause; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
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a prisoner were done because of beatings.' The considerations involved
in the Dickenson case are more complex than in the Schwable inquiry
since both the propaganda germ-warfare confession and the informing
charges are included."0 The Army contended that both were done without
coercion and for the purpose of securing favorable treatment." Dickenson
denied that he made false confessions and asserted that any informing
proved was done under coercion. 2
Since Schwable's false confession and Dickenson's alleged broadcasts
differ substantially from acts of disloyalty heretofore known," the deter-
mination of their seriousness requires the application of criteria not em-
ployed in the more common situation in which military information is
given. This does not mean, however, that the relative harm of these
admissions was any less than that of Dickenson's alleged betrayal of
prisoners, although the former probably had a less direct effect on troop
morale. On the other hand, Dickenson's alleged treacherous revelations
concerning his fellow captives closely resembles the classical situation of
the prisoner of war who discloses information of strategic importance in
order to obtain better treatment.
The problem of the prisoner who in the face of inhuman treatment
gives military information, informs on fellow prisoners, or even joins
the enemy forces is not new in the history of warfare.' In 1333 John
de Culewen,' " an Englishman, in fear for his life while a prisoner in the
hands of the Scots swore fealty to this enemy. The defense of fear for
life was held to be good, provided the captive returned his allegiance as
soon as possible. Hale also records a case decided in 1419 in which
". .. those who supplied with victuals Sir John Oldcastle and his accom-
plices then in rebellion . . .were acquitted by judgment of the court,
because it was found to be done pro timore mortis and quod recesserunt,
quam cito potuerunt." 6 The English courts have frequently reiterated
9. See Indianapolis Star, April 20, 1954, p. 3, col. 3. It is not clear how severe the
coercion was. Dickenson contended at the trial that he was beaten. However, his pre-
liminary statements do not indicate that he claimed severe beatings or fear of death.
10. Schematically the case breaks down into four basic possible alternative fact
situations-the propaganda confession with or without coercion as a defense, or the
informer charge with or without coercion as a defense. There could also be a composite
of these four basic situations.
11. See Indianapolis Star, April 20, 1954, p. 3, cols. 1-3.
12. Ibid.
13. See the discussion of the case of Major Boon at p. 610 infra.
14. See the report of the trial of Baldwin Tyrel in the Pleas of Trinity Term, A.D.
1214, in Cornwall, where coercion was attempted as a defense. 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE
CRO N 67 (The Selden Society 1887).
15. Close Roll, 7 Edw. 3, memb. 15 (1333), cited in 1 HALE, HiSTORlA PLACITORUM
CORONAE 167-8 (1736).
16. "... for fear of death and that they returned as quickly as they were able."
Id. at 50.
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this rule during the succeeding five centuries." However, bad conditions
and inhumane treatment while a prisoner of war have been held insuffi-
cient as a defense to the charge of treason for adhering to the King's
enemies," and the English courts have dealt harshly with persons who
were traitors under such circumstances."
The earliest American case involving a disloyal prisoner of war is
Respublica v. M'Carty.° The defendant was charged with high treason;
he had been taken prisoner by the British, confined at Wilmington, and
subsequently "enlisted" in the British Forces remaining with them for a
period of ten or eleven months. The Supreme Court said,2 ". . . nothing
will excuse the act of joining the enemy, but the fear of immediate death;
not the fear of any inferior personal injury, nor the apprehension of any
outrage upon property." In addition, he must have "... enlisted . . .
with a sincere intention to make his escape. .. ,. The rule as stated in
the M'Carty case has been repeated in several of the other early American
treason decisions. Early British and American cases reveal that the
17. In Rex v. MacGrowther, 18 How. St. Tr. 391, 394 (1746), a tenant of the Duke
of Perth was tried for treason for joining the Duke in a rebellion after threats of destruc-
tion of his home, crops, and some physical coercion. He was convicted. The court said,
at 394, ". . . the only excuse [for collaboration with the enemy] is a force upon the
person and present fear of death; and this force and fear must continue all the time the
party remains with the rebels. It is incumbent on every man, who makes force his de-
fence, to shew an actual force, and that he quitted the service as soon as he could. .. ."
18 Note that in the earlier cases the crime of treason is used to cover a multitude
of crimes both major and minor. Such things from the counterfeiting of coin up to the
actual plotting of the king's death were included within the definition of treason. The
Treason Act, 1351, 25 EDw. III, Stat. 5, c. 2, specifies as acts of treason-compassing or
imagining the death of the king, queen or their eldest son, the levying of war against
the king, adherence to the king's enemies, and giving his enemies aid and comfort.
19. See Rex v. Cundell, 4 Newgate Calendar 62 (1812). There a number of British
sailors and marines had been confined, in 1808, as prisoners of war on the Isle of France.
The court said: "The prison, being much crowded, was greatly incommoded with dirt
and vermin, and, there being no way of escaping from such inconvenience but that of
desertion, every art was practised by their keepers to induce the unhappy prisoners to
enter the French service. Fifty men, among whom were Cundell and Smith, had not
virtue enough to resist the temptations on the one hand, and the hope of escaping from
distress and filth on the other. They forgot their country and allegiance, and put on the
enemy's uniform, acting as sentinels over those who were so recently their companions
in captivity. These traitors continued to do duty with the French until the surrender of
the island to the British forces, when Cundell and Smith . . . threw themselves upon
the mercy of their country [and] surrendered to the English. . . . These culprits were
[then] transmitted to England, and a special commission was [established] for their trial,
which took place at the Surrey Court-house February 6, 1812. Cundell, Smith, and five
others were found guilty of adhering to His Majesty's enemies. . . . On Monday morn-
ing, March 16, 1812, William Cundell and John Smith, pursuant to their sentence were
hung. .. ."
20. 2 Dall. 86 (U.S. 1781).
21. Id. at 87.
22. M'Carty was found not guilty by the jury despite his confession in open court.
23. See United States v. Vigol, 2 Dall. 346 (U.S. 1795), where the defendant was
charged with intimidation of a revenue officer amounting to insurrection in the so-called
Whiskey Rebellion. Vigol was convicted after the court found that he did not come
606
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courts consistently drew a line between fear of immediate death and all
other degrees of duress and did not give any consideration to the relative
seriousness of the various acts of defection; all received the same relative
weight as harms under the umbrella-like category of treason.24
During the Civil War approximately two percent of the Union
soldiers who were taken prisoner subsequently joined the Confederate
forces, and about one percent of Confederate soldiers allied themselves
with the Union Army.25 In recognizing the defense of coercion, the
Judge Advocate General of the Army advised that if Union prisoners in
the hands of the Confederates were subjected to eaxtreme suffering and
privation which endangered their lives, 26 and were induced to enlist in the
Confederate Army solely to escape from the situation, they should not be
considered deserters.2 ' However, if these prisoners did not escape when
they might have, but had voluntarily remained, then the fact that they
were forced to join should not weigh in their favor.2" The acceptance of
this defense is the first indication of a wavering from the strict "fear of
immediate death" rule. The harm involved was commensurate with that
involved in older cases, though the degree of coercion was not as great.
No record of defections of captives appears again until the Second
World War, and there only two cases achieved any notoriety.29  Neither
of these involved directly the question of coercion. Factually they seem
similar to the Army's allegations of informing in the Dickenson case."0
within the rules articulated in Respublica v. M'Carty, 2 DalI. 86 (U.S. 1781), and United
States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,096, at 628 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814), where the defendant
while a prisoner of war acted in behalf of the British forces in attempting to procure
food and supplies to be used by the prisoners. Pryor was acquitted because his acts were
said not to come within the statutory meaning of treason in the statute. See also United
States v. Greiner, 4 Phila. 396 (1861).
24. See note 18 supra.
25. H.R. REP. No. 45, 40th CorSg., 3d Sess. 229, 742-755 (1869), cited in FLORY,
PRISONERS OF WAR 142-3 (1942). The Union deserters numbered 3,170 out of a total of
188,145 captured; Confederate deserters totaled 5,452 out of 476,149 captured.
26. Italics supplied.
27. A DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY 1076-7
(U.S. War Dep't 1912).
28. Id. at 1077.
29. Following the Second World War there were five cases resulting in convictions
for corresponding with the enemy, all involving facts remote to the Schwable or Dicken-
son situations. Communication to the Indiana Law Journal from Lt. Col. James K.
Gaynor, of the judge Advocate General Corps. These cases undoubtedly include the
cases of Martin James Monte, who was convicted of treason, and Dale H. Maple, who
was convicted of violating Article of War 81. For a complete factual coverage and dis-
cussion of these two cases, see WEYL, TREASON 390-399 (1950).
30. The first important case, in point of time, was that of chief signalman Harold
E. Hirshberg, who was tried in 1947 before a Navy general court-martial for ". . . mal-
treatment of two naval enlisted men . . . "who were prisoners of the Japanese. See
United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210, 211 (1949). Hirshberg was
was charged with a violation of Article 8 (2) of the Articles for the Government of the
Navy, REV. STAT. §1624 (1875), 34 U.S.C. §1200 (1946), which provides ". . . such
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These two decisions are important because they motivated the inclusion
of Article 105 in the Uniform Code of Military justice and reveal the
type of conduct it was intended to punish."'
Although the United States waited until 1950 to provide specifically
for the punishment of misconduct while a prisoner of war, the British
have had such a measure in their Army Act since 1881." They by-passed
punishment as a court-martial may adjudge may be inflicted on any person in the
Navy . . . who is guilty of . . .maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders.. .."
Although convicted he was subsequently released by a federal district court in a habeas
corpus proceeding, United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 73 F. Supp. 990 (R.D.
N.Y. 1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1948), which was later affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court because of a lack of jurisdiction in the Navy court-martial.
The most publicized trial was that of Sergeant John David Provoo for treason. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1953, §4, p. 2, col. 6. Provoo, like Hirshberg, was charged with
willfully mistreating fellow prisoners while a captive of the Japanese on Corregidor fol-
lowing the surrender of the Philippines. Although coercion was not placed in issue, there
was a claim of insanity at the time of trial. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1953, p. 3, col. 5.
The Court found Provoo legally sane, although extremely unstable emotionally. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1953, p. 1, cols. 1-2. Provoo was found guilty of treason in Feb-
ruary 1953, and sentenced to life imprisonment. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1953, §4, p. 2,
col. 6. No report of the case has appeared to date. The trial was held in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge Noonan presiding.
31. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee o; Armed Serv-
ices on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1229, 1259 (1949) ; and Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1949). Until 1950 the prosecution of disloyal prisoners of war was
based on a charge of treason under 18 U.S.C. §2381 (1948), the general "aiding the
enemy" Article of War 81, 41 STAT. 804 (1920), 10 U.S.C. §1553 (1946), or as in the
Hirshberg case, some ambiguous article which was interpreted to cover the situation
although certainly not originally intended for such purpose. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2865-6 (1862).
However, in the new Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 STAT. 138 (1950), 50
U.S.C. c. 22 (1951), a provision, which became Article 105, was specifically inserted to
cover the Hirshberg-Provoo situation. The old Article of War 81 was carried over as
Article 104 with only inconsequential change.
The cases of Corporal Dickenson and Colonel Schwable are the first to arise under
Articles 104 and 105 of the Uniform Code, although Pfc. Rothwell B. Floyd was con-
victed of violating Article 105 of the Uniform Code on April 1, 1954, for offenses com-
mitted while a prisoner in Korea. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison by an Army
court-martial for murdering a fellow prisoner. See Louisville Courier-Journal, April 2,
1954, p. 6, col. 1. The Dickenson case is the first court-martial to be tried under the two
articles; thus no precedent exists to aid the interpretation of Article 105. However, the
most exhaustive treatise interpreting the Uniform Code has set forth in comprehensive
form the essential elements of the offenses under that article. See ScINEDEKER, MILi-
TARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 653-4 (1953). This author recognizes the de-
fense of coercion and states that if a member of the armed forces is captured and com-
pelled by threats of instant death or serious bodily harm to aid the enemy, he is not guilt3
of such aid unless he had a reasonable opportunity to escape and failed to avail himsell
of it. Id. at 522. Schnedeker cites as authority for this proposition, Respublica v
M'Carty, 2 Dall. 86 (U.S. 1781) ; see p. 606 supra.
32. Section 4 of the Army Act, 1881, 44 & 45 VicT., c. 58, provides, "... [e]ver
person subject to military law who . . . (5) [hlaving been made a prisoner of war
voluntarily serves with or voluntarily aids the enemy; . . . shall, on conviction hk
court-martial, be liable to suffer death, or such less punishment as is in this Act men
tioned." Under the French Code of Military Justice such activities come within thi
provision for treason. See Law of March 9, 1928, CODES DE JUSTICE MILITAiRE, ARMEi
NOTES
this provision in favor of prosecution for treason in two of the most
celebrated cases early in this century ;33 however, they employed it exten-
sively following the Second World War, when 36 servicemen were court-
martialed for voluntarily aiding the enemy while held captive. 4
Variations of the defense of coercion were raised frequently in these
cases and according to published accounts were allowed if the duress could
be proved to have been of a sufficient degree.35 What constituted a suf-
ficient degree is not entirely clear. A typical case is that of Henry Rose, 6
a stoker first class in the Royal Navy, who was tried for giving informa-
tion to the enemy while a prisoner of war. Rose had been on a British
ship sunk in the North Sea; he was rescued and questioned by the Ger-
mans. After rather severe physical torture, he was threatened with death
and shown the corpses of two British seamen who reportedly had refused
to talk. He thereupon agreed to give the desired information, which
concerned the structure of the interior of the engine room on a certain
type British destroyer. He was found guilty and sentenced to 16 years at
hard labor, 7 subsequently reduced to 5 years.38
Probably the most important and widely publicized proceeding of
this type was the court martial of Major Cecil Boon on eleven charges
covering acts alleged to have been committed while he was a prisoner in
Hong Kong.3" This case is particularly pertinent since it involved col-
DE TEaaa, Arts. 235, 236 (jurisprudence Generale Dalloz 1939). The Belgian Penal Code
in the section of Military justice is similar to the French. See Law of July 19, 1934,
Art. 15, which for the purposes of military justice incorporates, Articles 113-9, 121-3, and
123 quater of the BELGES CODES PENAL (1950).
33. See Rex v. Lynch, 1 K.B. 444 (1903). There a soldier of Irish descent, while
a prisoner during the Boer War in the South African Republic, took an oath of allegiance
to the Boers and helped form an armed body of men called the Second Irish Brigade for
the purpose of combating the British. It seems obvious that the strong anti-British
prejudices of the Irishman Lynch were capitalized to the fullest extent by the Boers in
enticing him to defect from his allegiance. Lynch was convicted of treason.
A similar case arose in the First World War, Rex v. Casement, 1 K.B. 98 (1917), in
which the defendant was charged with and convicted of violating the Treason Act, 1351,
25 EDW. 3, Stat. 5, c. 2, for soliciting and persuading certain other British subjects who
were prisoners of war in Germany to join what was called the Irish Brigade. This force
.vas supposed to fight solely "... for the cause of Ireland and under no circumstances
• . . [to] be directed to any German end." The plan was to put the Brigade ashore in
Ireland to stir up a rebellion there, which would, of course, have the effect of diverting
some of the British forces from the Continent. Casement was sentenced to death.
34. Several of these men were involved in pro-Nazi organizations, and a large
number had been members of the British Union of Fascists and similar organizations
in civilian life. The Times (London), April 12, 1946, p. 8, col. 4. See also Note, 56
YALE L.J. 1210, 1212 (1947).
35. See the cases of Francis McLardy, The Times (London), Jan. 30, 1946, p. 2,
col. 4, and Hugh Cowie, The Times (London), Jan. 5, 1946, p. 2, col. 7.
36. The Times (London), March 21, 1946, p. 2, col. 2.
37. The Times (London), March 25, 1946, p. 2, col. 2.
38. The Times (London), June 26, 1946, p. 2, col. 6.
39. The Times (London), Aug. 28, 1946, p. 2, col. 1; Aug. 29, 1946, p. 2, col. 1;
Aug. 30, 1946, p. 2, col. 4.
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laboration with the Japanese for propaganda purposes.4" The charges
included disclosure, to his captors, of information regarding proposed
escapes of other prisoners and the personal searching of prisoner of war
quarters which on one occasion uncovered a wireless set. Boon was also
charged with having written a letter to the commander of the American
Far East Air Force in which he complained of indiscriminate bombing of
the camp, a letter which was used for propaganda purposes and later
published in the Nippon Times. It admittedly complained of wholly fic-
titious raids. Boon either denied the charges or raised the defense of
coercion.4 The letter, he testified, was written after threats of punish-
ment or death.42 After the prosecution rested, the court dismissed six of
the eleven charges on the ground that no prima facie case had been estab-
lished.43 The defense was made on the remaining five charges on which
the court rendered a verdict of not guilty thereby accepting the plea of
coercion." A comparison of the Boon and Rose cases reveals a significant
change in the British approach. 5 It would seem that the coercion in the
latter case was more forceful, and this becomes especially clear when it is
noted that the duress in the Boon case was a threat of punishment or death
and that there was no evidence as to how forcefully these threats were
made, or with what degree of reasonableness Boon believed them.4 6 Rose,
however, was convicted, while Boon was freed. This suggests that the
judges determined that Rose's act was more serious than that committed
by Boon. It is important to note that there was a weighing of the gravity
of the offense against the degree of coercion involved in each case. It is
this process which merits further consideration.
Assuming that some degree of duress exists, the crucial problem
becomes one of policy. Here, as in that portion of criminal law which
pertains to coercion, generally, the commission of the crime is admitted,
but exculpation is sought on grounds of compulsion. Here also, as in
criminal law, the possible rationales for determining the quantity and
quality of punishment break down into the same general theories-deter-
rence, reformation, and just punishment."
40. See the discussion of this element in the Schwable case p. 611 infra.
41. The Times (London), Sept. 2, 1946, p. 2, col. 4.
42 Major Boon's defense was vaguely reported in the printed accounts, and it
appears that the threat was his own opinion of what was likely to happen if he did not
cooperate.
43. The Times (London), Sept. 13, 1946, p. 2, col. 4.
44. The Times (London), Sept. 21, 1946, p. 2, col. 2.
45. See the discussion p. 609 supra.
46. See note 57 supra.
47. For an excellent discussion of corecion in criminal law, see HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 405-426 (1947).
48. Id. at 420.
NOTES
As Professor Hall points out, te utilitarians in interpreting the
deterrence theory have insisted that a fear of future legal punishment
cannot equal the greater fear of immediate death."9 Thus, the proponents
of this theory argue for complete exoneration even for murder where
coercion amounting to fear of death is involved. Hall has indicated some
major inconsistencies in the utilitarian position by showing that they in-
sist on a punishment, in most crimes, which conforms to the strength of
the temptation. However, in situations involving extreme duress where
punishment should be the most severe to counteract temptation, they
advocate exculpation."0
More useful to both the criminal law and to the problem at hand is
the theory of just punishment. This rationale repudiates the claims of
the uncontrollable drive for self-preservation and the resulting complete
exculpation.51 It is based instead on the relative temptation involved. As
Professor Hall has put it, ". . . the theory of just punishment attempts
an evaluation of the gravity of the harm committed, posited on the prin-
ciple that human beings have a 'sufficient' degree of autonomy to justify.
their being held accountable for their actions. Unlike the deterrent theory,
it holds that as temptation increases, so do the claims of mitigation .... ""
As applied specifically to the prisoner of war situation such an approach
should consist of a consideration of the seriousness of the offense com-
mitted and its effect on military morale and the security of the nation.
The false confession and the giving of information must be dis-
tinguished when evaluating the gravity of the offense. Although the
former has indirect impact on the national security, its effect when used
as propaganda is of much greater intricacy and importance than is com-
monly supposed. It may be suggested that such confessions are of little
consequence since they are reputedly given slight credibility in world
public opinion and may be effectively countered by immediate denials
pointing out the undoubted use of coercion. This assertion may appeal
to the average American imbued with the patriotic fervor of war time;
however, it is an unpleasant fact that in a great number of the free
nations Russian-communist propaganda and American counter-propa-
ganda are often equated. There are many intelligent people in responsible
positions throughout the world who feel that all virtue and honesty in the
cold war does not lie with the United States. The reasons behind this
situation are varied and complex, one of the most basic being simply the
mergence of the United States as one of the two major world powers.
49. Id. at 416.
50. Id. at 419.
51 Id. at 421-6.
52. Id. at 421.
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Our global strategy of attempting to build a coalition against communism
has forced us into a position of unintentionally irritating many of the
nationalistic elements in the smaller noncommunist countries, particularly
in the Middle and Far East."8 It must be remembered that there was, and
may still be, a significant segment of world opinion which believed the
charges of bacteriological warfare of which the confessions of Colonel
Schwable and his colleagues formed such a basic part. 4
The harm resulting from yielding information to the enemy must be
evaluated according to the type of disclosure. Betrayal of fellow prisoners
almost exclusively affects their morale, while revealing knowledge of
troop concentrations and construction of weapons and various military
installations primarily concerns the security of military forces and, there-
fore, the nation. Accordingly, the first major consideration in determin-
ing the proper punishment of the defected prisoner requires a weighing of
the seriousness and effect of the act committed on the national security,
and of less importance, on military morale either in the prisoner of war
camp or in the armed forces generally.
The second determinant should be an evaluation of the degree of co-
ercion involved. Such may be interpreted to include everything from
mere unpleasant conditions (poor food, cold, crowded quarters) which
could have been the situation in the Dickenson case, to brutal and inhuman
physical torture, plus the most cunning psychological techniques such as
were reputedly administered Colonel Schwable. Generally, the greater
the degree of compulsion, the greater should be the degree of mitigation,
extending to complete exculpation in the case of extreme torture. How-
ever, it may not be possible to grant acquittal where the act is heinous
and of great seriousness despite severe coercion. It should, however, to
some extent, reduce the punishment to be inflicted even where the act is
of this nature.
The last criterion in the determination of the proper punishment
should be an appraisal of the opportunity for escape, for deterring, stall-
ing, or deceiving the coercionist.
Initially, it should be remembered that there is a basic difference
between the disclosure of military information under coercion and the
false confession to be used for propaganda purposes. This should be
reflected in the soldier's indoctrination before combat as well as in the ap-
53 The problems involved in our relations with the Arab nations in the Near East,
Iran, India, and Indo-China are all based on this unfortunate situation.
54. There were many well-educated Frenchmen and Englishmen, such as the Dean
of Canterbury, who claimed to believe these charges. Admittedly many of these people
are inveterate distrusters of America, but in an environment of freedom of speech and
press, they chose to believe the communist propaganda.
NOTES
proach taken by authorities after the act has been committed. In the former
situation it is possible that with some precombat indoctrination a technique
of clever fabrication could be utilized by the captured soldier to satisfy
the captor and still maintain the security of his military forces. In the
false confession situation the problem is more difficult. Obviously, the
captor cannot be deceived since he knows exactly what he wants his
prisoner to say or write or sign. If he persists, the captive is left with
only the alternatives of compliance or death; there is no chance to make
a "false" false confession. In no manner, however, can the subsequent
punishment of the serviceman alter the effect such confession had on
world public opinion. This can only be accomplished by counter-propa-
ganda, and the insistence on neutral investigation of charges.55 Thus, the
determination of the penalty to be imposed should be based on the factors
discussed above regarding the theory of just punishment.5"
Under this proposal a much more detailed statement of the facts is
required than under other theories of penal liability, and a difficult evalua-
tion of harms is involved.17  Nevertheless, this should not seriously
prejudice the adoption of this plan since use of them involves large
amounts of uncertainty regarding both their ultimate effect and applica-
tion." Acceptance of the theory of just punishment would entail the
surrender of any absolute formula of exculpation such as the "fear of
immediate death" rule.. 9
55. There is a possibility that a change or more properly an addition to the 1949
Geneva Convention might have a salutary effect on the coerced confession problem. As
is frequently the case, the communist use of the coerced confession is an adjunct to the
simultaneous trial of the confessor, as in the cases of Robert Voegler, William Oatis, and
Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty. If, as was suggested by some international legal scholars at
the time of the Nurnberg trials of the war criminals, an international court could be set
up to try such charges as constitute war crimes, which would include the germ-warfare
accusation, the opportunity for use of the trial and confession as propaganda devices
could in this manner be substantially removed. If such a court were established it could
be given jurisdiction to try all such war crimes. Thus, the captor, upon the filing of
such charges against a prisoner, would be required to place him in the custody of the
international court. It is unfortunate in this regard that the Big Four Powers did not
see fit to heed this advice before Nurnberg since now the communist powers have a very
persuasive and embarassing precedent in support of trial by the captor.
With this one exception, it seems that a change in international law could have little
effect on the problem of these coerced confessions since compulsion on the part of the
captor is at present illegal under the Geneva Convention of 1949, 75 U. N. TREATY SERIES
972 (1950). This is probably one of those unfortunate situations where no perfect solu-
tion exists. The only feasible alternative seems to be the use of a penetrating expose of
the methods used by communist captors and insistence on investigation by a neutral inter-
national commission.
56. See the discussion pp. 611-612 supra.
57. HALL, op. cit. supra note 47, at 425.
58. Id. at 420.
59. See discussion pp. 605-607 supra. Hall suggests that in addition to murder, the
crimes of rape, kidnapping, treason, and very serious mayhem-generally all punishable
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In applying the just punishment theory to the cases of Schwable and
Dickenson it is reasonable to expect in the former (if all the facts of the
defense are believed) that the result of a court-martial, if such were held,
would be either complete exculpation or, at worst, some very light form
of reprimand.6" Although Schwable's act is of a serious nature consider-
ing the over-all effect on the national security,6" the degree of coercion
should be sufficient to grant exculpation. Moreover, there is no plausible
way in which his communist captors could have been deceived by falsifi-
cation since they knew exactly what they wanted him to do. In Dicken-
son's situation,6 2 if the broadcast and betrayal are proved and it is deter-
mined that no coercion existed,63 the court-martial might result in severe
punishment, going to the maximum under the Uniform Code.6  How-
ever, even if his proposed defense is believed,6" the Corporal's punishment
should be more severe than Schwable's since the coercion was apparently
less rigorous.
To determine the proper punishment coercion should not auto-
matically be the basis for complete exculpation, but rather should con-
stitute a mitigating factor depending on the seriousness of the offense
committed, the degree of coercion involved, and the relative opportunities
for avoidance by fabrication or escape. Finally, it would be advisable to
supplement precombat indoctrination by instruction in the techniques of
falsifying information especially for those who in their military positions
have access to information vital to military and national security. It
should also be remembered that the morale of any army is more properly
based on a firm conviction that what they fight for is right and honorable,
than on a fear of severe punishment and degradation if they should waver
from their allegiance under the most brutal form of coercion.
by death or long terms of imprisonment-should be placed beyond the defense of coercion.
Hall, op. cit. supra note 47, at 425.
60. See note 7 supra.
61. See discussion p. 611 supra.
62. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
63. There is a much more difficult problem of proof in Dickenson's case since it
involves acts allegedly done inside the prisoner of war camp where the available evidence
may amount only to rumor or hearsay among the prisoners. See Indianapolis Star, April
20, 1954, p. 3, cols. 1-3.
64. The maximum sentence under Art. 104 is death, and under Art. 105 life im-
prisonment can be imposed. However, death has been apparently ruled out in Cpl. Dicken-
son's case. See Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 18, 1954, p. 2, col. 2. The Army court-
martial found Dickenson guilty of betraying fellow prisoners, sentenced him to ten years
at hard labor, and recommended a dishonorable discharge. See Louisville Courier-
Journal, May 5, 1954, p. 1, cols. 7-8.
65. See notes 10 and 11 supra and accompaniying text.
